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In the middle of the 20th century, the international community began for the first time to grapple with 
the problem of reckoning with mass atrocity. A deep tension exists, however, between processes of 
judicial and para-judicial reckoning, which deal with the direct perpetrators and victims of atrocity 
and the instinct to attribute extended historical responsibility to whole categories of people.
Taking advantage of the unconditional surrenders of Germany and Japan that concluded the 
Second World War, the victorious allies conducted tens of thousands of trials of alleged perpetrators 
of atrocities both in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region.1 The formal basis for these prosecutions 
varied from country to country – some prosecuting powers referred to otherwise undefined “laws 
and customs of war”, some used specific retrospective legislation, still others relied on existing 
domestic criminal law – but collectively the trials were based on a new vision of responsibility 
for wartime atrocity. Whereas wartime brutality had once been understood to be protected by 
the sovereign right of the state to wage war and by the so-called “belligerent rights” of military 
personnel to kill in the name of military necessity, the post-war trials asserted on a scale not seen 
before or since that individual perpetrators bore individual responsibility for their acts.
In asserting the individual responsibility of perpetrators on this unprecedented scale, the 
prosecuting powers had two motives. The first motive was to establish a framework for post-conflict 
justice that would both reduce the customary impunity of soldiers for wartime misdeeds and avoid 
the moral problem of harsh, generalized retaliation against a defeated enemy. The vast number of 
cases to be heard and the problems of identifying suspects and of collecting and assessing evidence 
meant that many of the post-war trials followed expedited procedures, accepting dubious evidence 
and paying scant attention to the defense case. Sentencing practice was uneven: some defendants 
were sentenced to death for relatively modest acts of brutality; other defendants received terms 
of imprisonment for apparently egregious acts of cruelty. The prosecuting powers, however, 
compared the trials with the arbitrary reckoning of previous times and regarded them as a major 
advance, rather than measuring them against the standards of civil criminal trials in peacetime. 
The second motive of the victorious powers in conducting individual criminal trials was to 
diminish the attribution of guilt to whole nations as had happened after the First World War, when 
Germany was required in the Treaty of Versailles to acknowledge guilt for launching the war. This 
guilt clause, and other openly punitive articles in the Versailles Treaty, were widely perceived to 
have created a legitimate sense of grievance in Germany and thereby to have contributed to the 
conditions which led to the rise of Hitler. Accordingly, the Potsdam Declaration, issued by the 
United States, Britain and China in July 1945 in anticipation of the final victory over Japan, made 
an explicit distinction between the Japanese people as a whole and those who had committed war 
crimes: “We do not intend to enslave the Japanese people but stern justice shall be meted out to all 
war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.”2
Public rhetoric by officials and members of the public on the Allied side did not always 
maintain this distinction between perpetrators and the nation to which they had belonged. In the 
popular press and even in the trials themselves, it is easy to find references to the alleged collective 
guilt of Japan and of the Japanese people. Nonetheless, the distinction remained at the core of 
most informed discussion of the trial process. In September 1947, Sir William Webb, president of 
 
1 Sandra Wilson, Robert Cribb, Beatrice Trefalt and Dean Aszkielowicz, Japanese War Criminals: The Politics of Justice after the 
Second World War (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017); Norbert Frei, “Nach der Tat: Die Ahndung deutscher 
Kriegs- und NS-Verbrechen in Europa - eine Bilanz,” in Norbert Frei, ed., Transnationale Vergangenheitspolitik: Der 
Umgang mit deutschen Kriegsverbrechern in Europa nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2006), 7-36. 
2 United States Department of State, “Proclamation by the Heads of Governments, United States, China and the United 
Kingdom, July 26, 1945,” Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (the Potsdam 
Conference), 1945, vol. 2 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945), 1476.
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the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (also known as the Tokyo Trial), blocked the 
prosecution from raising examples of good conditions and favorable treatment in camps:
We know that there are tens of thousands of kind-hearted Japanese. We would assume in the 
army itself, in the navy, in the air force, many Japanese behaved very well but that is not an 
answer to these charges. Meet the charges made against you and do not try to prove that in 
other cases where no charges were made no faults could be found.3
This determination to separate individual perpetrators from the nation to which they belonged 
was also encouraged by the United States’ hope of reshaping Japan as an ally in the emerging 
Cold War.
In the period from late 1945 until 1951, seven Allied powers in the Asia-Pacific region – Australia, 
the Republic of China, France, the Netherlands Indies, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and 
the United States – prosecuted around 5700 men and one woman in 2362 separate trials. The 
defendants faced a variety of charges, some of them arising from infringements of the 1929 Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, some of them arising from an expanded 
definition of war crimes which covered abuses carried out against civilians in occupied territories. 
The specific charges included murder, torture, rape, arbitrary execution, ill treatment of prisoners-
of-war, including beatings and the deprivation of food, medicine and shelter as well as some more 
specific cases including medical experiments, cannibalism and forced prostitution. To this number 
must be added some thousands who were prosecuted in makeshift Chinese local courts and more 
thousands who were prosecuted by the Soviet Union. No significant research has been done on 
either of these categories of trials, but it is likely that at least two thousand men were prosecuted in 
each case, meaning that the total number prosecuted in Asia and the Pacific is around, but possibly 
greater than, 10,000. This number is dwarfed by that in Europe, estimated by Norbert Frei to have 
exceeded 96,000.4 Since that time, only the gacaca (“grassroots”) courts of Rwanda have processed 
a greater number of defendants, though at the cost of highly expedited procedures.5
One might expect that the scale of the reckoning with Japanese perpetrators would have 
established the post-war trials as a major landmark in the history of international humanitarian 
law. Yet this is not the case. Not only have the trials received relatively little attention until 
recently – notably, at the time of presentation there is no Wikipedia entry devoted to the topic 
– but a widespread public discourse maintains that Japan has failed to make proper amends for 
its wartime crimes. The initial insistence of the Allied powers that wartime guilt would be dealt 
with in the comprehensive prosecution of individual perpetrators appears to have been derailed. 
Instead, more than seventy years after the end of the Second World War, at a time when all but 
a tiny handful of victims, perpetrators and eyewitnesses have died, Japanese people are widely 
presumed to carry extended historical responsibility for the wartime actions of their forebears.
This derailment of the Allies’ intentions occurred for three reasons. First, the trials ended before 
the full list of suspects had been exhausted. With the evidence available, Allied courts might have 
tried some hundreds, possibly thousands, more suspects. Instead, these suspects were released and 
the cases against them were dropped. This failure to pursue all suspects was partly a consequence 
of changing political circumstances in the Asia-Pacific region – independence, civil war, communist 
revolution and the economic incentives to restore good relations with Japan all played a part – 
along with the general fatigue of the prosecuting authorities. The consequence, however, was that 
men who had avoided trial emerged and played significant roles in post-war politics. Prominent 
examples included Kishi Nobusuke (later prime minister), who had been responsible for the 
recruitment of Chinese forced labor in Manchuria6 and Tsuji Masanobu (member of parliament) 
who had apparently played a significant role in the 1942 massacre of Chinese associated with 
3 Transcript, Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, September 3, 1947, 27474, Legal Tools 
TR13-263-a_04.
4 Frei, Nach der Tat, 31-32.
5 Christopher J. Le Mon, “Rwanda’s Troubled Gacaca Courts,” Human Rights Brief 14, no. 2 (2007), 16-20.
6 Malcolm Trevor, Japan: Restless Competitor: the Pursuit of Economic Nationalism (Richmond: Japan Library, 2001), 123.
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the Guomindang (Chinese Nationalist Party) in Singapore. The second reason for derailment 
was the growing awareness of the failure of the trial process to address the full range of Japanese 
wartime misdeeds. In particular, it became apparent that the United States had worked to prevent 
prosecution of Japanese personnel involved in the notorious experiments on living humans carried 
out by Unit 731 in Manchuria. The U.S. protected those responsible because it wished to gain access 
to the data arising from the experiments.7 Moreover, the trials did not address any Japanese crimes 
against Koreans or Taiwanese. Under international law at the time, actions by a state against its 
own people were not considered war crimes. Because Korea and Taiwan had been subject to Japan 
at the start of the period covered by the trials, the sometimes-forced recruitment of Koreans and 
Taiwanese as laborers and military prostitutes was outside the scope of the judicial process. The 
absence of attention to these issues increasingly cast a shadow of inadequacy over the trial process.
The third reason for the sense of unrequited Japanese guilt was a complex set of circumstances 
that cast Japanese atrocities as egregiously evil. One of these circumstances was the deep 
indignation of Western captives of the Japanese military at the conditions they had experienced 
during the war. For Westerners, the humiliation of subordination to Asians whom they had been 
led to despise, along with the loss of their former privileges in colonial societies, in the context 
of a catastrophic decline in living conditions for everyone in the Japanese occupied territories 
and Japanese unpreparedness for the task of managing large communities of captives, led to a 
large memoir literature that demonized the Japanese as a whole.8 Another circumstance was the 
general inclination to equate German and Japanese wartime atrocities, disregarding the absence of 
any program of genocide, as the term is commonly understood, on the Japanese side. Yet another 
circumstance was the growing awareness of the scale of damage caused by the dropping to the 
two atomic bombs on Japan near the end of the war. Especially as the invisible horror of radiation 
sickness became apparent, defenders of the bombs played them up as a necessary measure against 
the especial evil of Japan, particularly an alleged, but fictitious, Japanese intention to kill all 
prisoners as Allied forces approached. 
In many parts of the world, the failure of courts to deliver socially- expected outcomes leads to 
vigilantism that is to violence against presumed perpetrators by indignant citizens. In the case of 
Japan, the perception that courts failed to deliver justice has led not to lynching but to what might 
be called the Great East Asia History War. For some Chinese and Korean government authorities 
and people, Japan’s inadequate accounting for its past authorizes a sustained campaign to restrict 
Japan’s role in regional and international affairs. For example, in 2016 a Chinese diplomat advised 
the Australian government against purchasing new submarines from Japan on the grounds of 
Japan’s failure to deal with its history.9
At this point, I would like to introduce an unexpected comparison. In October 1965, a small 
elite group within the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI) undertook a 
coup against the high command of the Indonesian army in which six generals, including the army 
commander, General Ahmad Yani, were killed.10 The coup took place in the context of the declining 
health of Indonesia’s founding president, Sukarno, who managed an unstable, semi-authoritarian 
system he called Guided Democracy, which kept the major political forces – communists, the 
military and Islamists – in an uneasy stalemate. The PKI was the largest communist party in the 
non-communist world and it dominated public discourse in Indonesia. If elections had been held, 
it would probably have won a plurality of votes. The party, however, was vulnerable to repression 
because it lacked influence in the armed forces and there were rumors that the army high command 
7 Sheldon H. Harris, Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932-45, and the American Cover-up (London: Routledge, 
1994).
8 See for instance, Rohan Rivett, Behind Bamboo: An Inside Story of the Japanese Prison Camps (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 
1946); John Coast, Railroad of Death (London: Hyperion Press, 1946).
9 Cameron Stewart, “Don’t forget the war with Japan, China warns Australia,” The Australian, February 17, 2016, accessed 
May 10, 2017, https://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/foreign-affairs/dont-forget-the-war-with-japan-
china-warns-australia/news-story/56d9a17c5b68a946c9ce4b00a2c42b7b.
10 John Roosa, Pretext for mass murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto’s Coup d’état in Indonesia (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 2006).
Atrocity and the Limits of Historical Guilt
©2018     Genocide Studies and Prevention 12, no. 3  https://doi.org/10.5038/1911-9933.12.3.1641
7
planned a coup of its own later in October 1965. In these circumstances, it appears that the party 
leader, D.N. Aidit, conspired with junior army officers to kidnap the army leaders and to engineer 
a decisive shift to the left in Indonesian politics which would enable the PKI to accede to power as 
Sukarno’s influence declined. In the event, six of the generals were killed, a mass assassination that 
shocked the Indonesian political community. The PKI coup, however, was poorly organized and 
it was quickly suppressed by anti-communist forces under the then little-known General Suharto. 
Like Japan’s 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor, the abortive PKI coup was an act of daring and 
desperation. In 1941, the United States had implemented against Japan an embargo on strategic 
materials that had the potential to cripple Japan’s war effort in China. Faced with a choice between 
a humiliating, damaging backdown and a bold strike with only small chance of success, Japan’s 
leaders chose the bold option of a pre-emptive strike. If the military, dominated by anti-communists, 
came to power in a coup against Sukarno, the PKI risked losing everything that it had worked for 
in the preceding decade. Japan’s venture seemed promising for six months, but it ran aground in 
a war of attrition against a much better endowed enemy. Japan’s cities were burnt to cinders in 
firebombing raids and defeat was sealed by the dropping of the atomic bombs. The PKI’s venture 
was defeated within 24 hours. Over the next six months, Suharto not only engineered a transfer of 
political power to himself from Sukarno but also presided over a mass murder of PKI members and 
associates in which approximately 500,000 people were killed. The military played a major role in 
authorizing and coordinating this killing, but most of it was vigilante in the sense that it took place 
outside any legal process.11 Both the Japanese people and the members of the PKI paid a terrible 
price for their leaders’ adventurism.
In both cases, moreover, after the immediate brutal reckoning, both groups were encumbered 
with accusations of treacherous behavior and extraordinary cruelty. In addition to false stories 
of the torture of the murdered generals, Suharto’s regime, known as the New Order, summoned 
up memories of the so-called Madiun rebellion 17 years earlier, when communist forces had 
certainly been involved in atrocities against their enemies. The government systematically 
portrayed communism as amongst the greatest threats that Indonesia continued to face and 
systematically discriminated against surviving party members and associates. Former detainees 
– possibly numbering hundreds of thousands – were denied civil rights. Under a later extension 
of discrimination, anyone deemed not to be “environmentally clean” – which included relatives 
of party members born long after 1965 – was excluded from sensitive positions, including post 
government jobs. Every year, all students in the education system were required to watch a lurid, 
government-sponsored propaganda film about the coup that spread falsehoods about the cruelty of 
PKI members towards the murdered generals. The government regularly sponsored publications 
with titles such as, The latent danger of the PKI.12
Japan and the PKI were punished for failed grabs for power accompanied by gratuitous 
cruelty. Japan was punished substantially, the PKI savagely. Since the time of punishment, each 
has faced accusations of historical guilt borne by generations that were not alive at the time the 
atrocities were committed.
The idea of extended historical responsibility has both unsavory and respectable origins. Its 
unsavory origins lie in the feud, the practice of cross-generational vengeance-seeking for ancient 
wrongs. Its respectable origins lie in the 1946 essay of Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage, in which he 
proposed that all Germans, even those born after the Second World War, bear an enduring guilt 
for the Holocaust.13 Jaspers’ assertion arguably attached unique significance to the Holocaust, but 
the American philosopher Michael Sandel has expressed the principle in much broader terms: if 
we take pride in the achievements of our ancestors, then we have to accept the shame that comes 
from their crimes.14
11 Jess Melvin, The army and the Indonesian genocide: Mechanics of mass murder (Milton: Taylor and Francis, 2018).
12 Ariel Heryanto, State terrorism and political identity in Indonesia: Fatally belonging (London: Routledge, 2006).
13 Karl Jaspers, Die Schuldfrage (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1946).
14 Michael J. Sandel, Justice: What’s the right thing to do? (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2010).
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Plausible though Sandel’s argument is, there are three reasons we should be wary of applying 
it uncritically. First, it is clear that imputing historical guilt has a strong political utility. It authorizes 
both general prejudice and a specific claim that particular groups are disqualified from the full 
exercise of civil or human rights. Whether historical guilt leads to the exclusion of communists from 
Indonesian politics or to Japan from regional and global affairs, we should be hesitant to accept 
it. Second, claims of historical guilt are unusually subject to selective moral outrage. The Chinese 
Communist Party rebukes Japan for the scale of Japanese atrocities during the Sino-Japanese War 
of 1937-1945 but restricts discussion of the deaths that its own policies inflicted on the Chinese 
people during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.15 Third, to resist the idea that 
historical guilt can ever be expunged will inevitably discourage all willingness to engage with 
the past on the part of the heirs of the perpetrators. Why should anyone accept an uncomfortable 
reckoning when they know that it will never be enough?
This unlikely pairing of fascist militarism and Third World communism suggests grounds 
on which we might limit the application of doctrines of historical guilt. First, it is important to ask 
what reckoning has been done. In the cases of both Japan and the PKI, a savage historical reckoning 
has been ignored in order to provide a basis for continuing political exclusion. This reckoning 
reduces the grounds for continuing to demand satisfaction for past wrongs. Second, it is important 
to ask whether the heirs of the perpetrators enjoy a present-day advantage as a result of crimes 
of the past. This question is especially relevant to settler colonial societies that prospered on the 
dispossession of indigenous peoples, but it applies to many colonial situations. Neither Japan nor 
the PKI obtained any advantage from adventurism, and this absence of advantage ought to count 
in regarding the ledger as closed. And third, it is important to ask whether the heirs of the victims 
still suffer the consequences of those past crimes. This question, too, is relevant to reckoning with 
the legacy of colonialism. Recompense and recognition for elderly victims ought to be matter of 
priority, but the broad picture in the cases of China, Korea and Indonesia is that these modern 
societies have outgrown whatever consequences they may have experienced in the past as a result 
of the adventurism of Japan and the PKI. In all three societies, dwelling on the grievances of these 
specific pasts is self-indulgent. We should reserve our indignation for the cases that matter.
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